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physiological explanation, is the common error of mysticism. The mystic steadfastly refuses to define God as the mystical experience; He is "not the experience but the giver of the experience." As the author rightly insists, the experience as experience is a fact wholly independent of what the experience means. The full comprehension and avoidance of these two errors should clear up much confusion and obviate common errors in metaphysical thought; not, again, that 'metaphysical' beliefs must be true to have value or to survive; on the contrary, their value and survival power are independent of their truth or falsity.

We may, as we saw above, differentiate 'scientific' and 'metaphysical' beliefs since the one does and the other does not have objective effects. In a similar manner we may differentiate religious values from those of the other value-disciplines on the basis of "the objects to which they are said to attach." Having thus isolated religious values the author offers a classification of them "which will make clearer what would be an objective, behavioristic account of religious values." It is a classification logically developed and concretely applied.

But beliefs are modes of response or organic attitudes, either positive or negative and, although truth does not, properly speaking, attach to beliefs, but only to propositions, we may call a belief true or false when the response accords with the truth or falsity of the proposition responded to. Add to this the further statement that the instinctive-emotional nature of man determines the response, and you have one of the primary bases for the biological foundation of belief. The instincts, however, singly or in integrated complexes, pure or defiled by accumulations from experience (if they are anything other than the objective responses) are not religion: religion requires in addition "a belief as to the reality of some more or less supernatural object or objects about which these instincts are united into a religious complex." We thought that "belief consists either of an actual response or of an organic attitude." Here is surely definition from two different points of view. The author proceeds: "But, without such instincts as *driving forces* (italics ours) in human life, religious belief would not exist among men." What, then, is an instinct? and what is a belief? We are not greatly helped by the statement that "so far as questions of positivity and negativity in the behavioristic sense, and truth and falsity in the logical sense are concerned, belief and judgment are practically interchangeable."

The second argument in favor of a biological foundation of belief is the survival value, the almost universality, the permanency through change, the self-evident nature of certain beliefs. This could be, so the argument goes, only on the hypothesis of a biological foundation. The adoption of the behavioristic point of view makes such an evolutionary basis defensible.

The concluding essay presents in general outline the principles which should obtain in religious and moral education. The system rests almost entirely on the doctrines of recapitulation and of sublimation, although the latter doctrine supposes the former as a basis.

L. B. HOISINGTON

*Psychology for Normal Schools.* By L. A. AVERILL. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921. Pp. xx, 362. \$2.25.

In this book the prospective teacher is told what instinctive behavior is natural to the child, and what emotions are when emotion is regarded as a phase of instinctive behavior. Sensation, perception, attention, memory, imagination, thought are all presented as activities or as reactions to external stimuli. The reader is encouraged to look for manifestations of these activities in the child, and instances of their normal occurrence are cited. So

far the author is consistent with the general purpose of the book, to present a psychology of childhood; but a discussion of heredity, which he now introduces, seems to be beside the point, because it does not add to the store of knowledge about the behavior of children to know that they have probably not inherited their parents' acquired characters. If we read beneath the surface, however, we find that the unexpressed mission of the book is to plead for the educational and moral welfare of children, which welfare is to be obtained by means of a thorough and sympathetic knowledge of children and by control of their heredity. Besides the straightforward account of behavior to which we have referred, other material is added to extend the prospective teacher's knowledge of the nature of the child. There are chapters dealing with the exceptionally bright and the exceptionally dull child; with psycho-neuroses and the unstable nervous system; with the delinquent child; and with the period of adolescence. These are followed by the final chapter on the "evolution of the social attitude toward children." It is this chapter which indicates most conclusively that the author desires to do more than write a psychological account of childhood.

Such a book is not strictly a psychology of childhood; but it is a faithful account, in very elementary terms, of the topics with which it deals. It is so elementary that it tells but little of behavior that any observing eldest child in a family has not noted for himself. Since, however, it is intended for pupils in normal schools who have just completed high-school, perhaps its simplicity is not too extreme.

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